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The Aumann (1990) conjecture states that cheap-talk messages do not neces-
sarily help to coordinate on efﬁcient Nash equilibria. In an experimental test of
Aumann’s conjecture, Charness (2000) found that cheap-talk messages facilitate
coordination when they precede the action, but not when they follow the action.
Standard game-theoretical modeling abstracts from thistiming effect, and therefore
cannot account for it. To allow for a formal analysis of the timing effect, I study
the sequential equilibria of the signaling game in which the sender is modeled as
comprising two selves: an acting self and a signaling self. I interpret Aumann’s
argument in this context to imply that all of the equilibria in this game are ‘bab-
bling’ equilibria, in which the message conveys no information and does not affect
the behavior of the receiver. Using this framework, I show that a fully communica-
tive equilibrium exists — only if the message precedes the action but not when the
message follows the action. In the latter case, no information is transmitted in any
equilibrium. This result provides a game-theoretical explanation for the puzzling
experimental results obtained by Charness (2000). I discuss other explanations for
this timing-of-message effect and their relationship to the current analysis.
Keywords pre-play communication, Nash equilibrium, coordination games, mul-
tiple selves
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11 Introduction
“Cheap talk” communication is a prevalent part of economic interactions across many
domains. Although cheap-talk pre-play communication does not carry the potential
strategicpowerofcostlysignaling,itisnonethelesslikelytohaveaneffectinsometypes
of games, especially when the sender and the receiver have some common interests
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell and Rabin, 1996). One important class of such
games consists of coordination games such as the Stag-Hunt game depicted as Game 1
below. The game has two equilibriain pure strategies, namely (A,A) and (B,B). As (B,B)
pareto-dominates (A,A), the two players clearly have a shared interest to coordinate on
the cooperative outcome (90,90). However, playing the cooperative strategy B involves
greater strategic uncertainty than the ‘safe’ option A. The payoff-inferior equilibrium





Intuitively, it seems that if the players can discuss the game before playing, they
would easily be able to coordinate on the pareto-dominant equilibrium. In other words,
the Nash equilibrium is a “self-enforcing agreement”. By the nature of Nash equilibria,
a message from the sender indicating that she plays B is indeed self-committing, i.e., the
sender has no incentive not to comply with the message if she expects it to be believed.2
However, Aumann (1990) has argued that such a message is not self-signaling, in the
sense that it does not inform the receiver that the sender indeed plays B. Essentially, the
argument is the following one: Rather than conveying the literal information contained
in the message, the message merely informs the receiver that the sender wishes him to
believe that she plays B.3 Since this is true regardless of the sender’s actual strategy, the
message carries no relevant new information for the receiver. In other words, Aumann
(1990) claims that the beliefs of the receiver should not be affected by the message sent
by the sender.
Notwithstanding the normative appeal of Aumann’s (1990) argument, there is some
experimental evidence showing that pre-play messages can be effective in this setting
1Harsanyi (1995) considers risk dominance to be the crucial choice criterion among different equilib-
ria.
2In this paper I consider the sender to be female and the receiver to be male.
3Farrell (1993) goes even further, and suggests that the message might inform the receiver that the
sender wishes him to believe that she wishes him to believe that she plays B. This line of reasoning can
be extended recursively ad inﬁnitum.
2under some conditions (Clark et al., 2001; Charness, 2000).4 One important variable
to come out of the literature is the timing of the signal, which was ﬁrst raised in the
literature by Farrell (1988), based on his analysis of to games with pre-play communi-
cation. The analysis, utilizing a new solution concept, predicts that cheap-talk pre-play
messages lead to coordination on the pareto-efﬁcient equilibrium. Consequently, Far-
rell (1988) conjectured that Aumann’s (1990) argument only holds when the message
follows the action. Charness (2000) followed up on Farrell’s (1988) comment in an ex-
periment with one-way messages from one player to another. In the AS treatment, the
sender ﬁrst decides on an action and then sends a message indicating her game action,
whereas in the SA treatment, the temporal order is reversed. Although the two temporal
orders are equivalentfrom an informationalperspective, theywere found to resultin sig-
niﬁcantly different behavior in the experiment.5 When the game decision made by the
sender follows the message, the proportions of B decisions and (B,B) outcomes greatly
and signiﬁcantly increase. Conversely, when the message was preceded by the game
decision, B choices were not signiﬁcantly more frequent than in a no-communication
baseline treatment, but were signiﬁcantly less frequent than in the SA treatment.6 Thus,
the experimental data supports Farrell’s (1988) conjecture.
In this paper, I propose a framework in which the timing of messages can be mod-
eled, and apply it to the experimental game of Charness (2000). The results of the anal-
ysis reveal a hidden subtlety in the theoretical argument. Most importantly, the analysis
provides an explanation for the puzzling experimental results. In the new framework,
the game is represented as a signaling game, in which messages and beliefs can be an-
alyzed. To model the timing in the game, I model the sender as comprising two selves:
an acting self and a signaling self. This modeling choice gives rise to a three-player
extensive-form game, which is then solved using standard game-theoretical tools. In
this framework, I interpret Aumann’s (1990) statement to mean that all sequential equi-
libria in the game are “babbling” equilibria, in which “the Sender’s message is uninfor-
mative and is ignored by the receiver” (Crawford, 1998, p. 287). I ﬁnd that, when the
action precedes the message, sequential equilibria exist, in which the message conveys
some information. However, when the message is informative to the degree that the
receiver no longer ignores it, it cannot be sequentially rational. Thus, the claim holds in
4Clark et al. (2001)foundthat two-way pre-playcommunicationlead to a signiﬁcant increase in coor-
dinationonthecooperativeequilibriumandthatsubjectsweremuchmorelikelytochoosethecooperative
action if the cooperative messages were sent. Nonetheless, they concluded that Nash equilibria are not
self enforcing in this game, since, even with communication, subjects chose the cooperative action only
42% of the time and only 57.5% of the choices conform to a rule conditioning on cooperative messages.
5Luce (1990) argues that abstracting from the temporal aspect of decisions is “A clear failing of the
modeling” (p. 228).
6The increase in coordinationon the payoff-dominantequilibrium in the AS treatment was marginally
signiﬁcant under a single-period analysis. Furthermore, less conservative tests, which ignore within-
subject and within-matchinggroupdependencies,detect a signiﬁcant increase in all measures, suggesting
that messages that follow the action do have a moderate effect on cooperation.
3a weaker variant, namely in all sequential equilibria the message is either uninformative
or ignored by the receiver (or both). Conversely, when the message precedes the action,
many communicativesequential equilibria exist, deﬁned as equilibria in which the mes-
sage is both informative and acted-upon. In particular, there exists a pure equilibrium in
which the message is fully informativeand is perfectly acted upon. This is true not only
in the Stag-Hunt game, but generally for coordination games.7
The intuition behind the result can be understood in terms of a sequential process
involving mistakes. The sender makes two decisions, an action decision and a signaling
decision. When considering an equilibrium in which the signal is aligned with the
action (and is believed by the receiver), the multiple-selves model makes the sequential
nature of the decision process explicit, and requires the equilibrium to specify how the
sender would react upon discovering she has made a mistake in her ﬁrst decision (for
example, by absentmindedly pressing the wrong key). If the sender has sent the wrong
message, it is rational for her to alter her action accordingly, so that the message is still
reliable. Conversely, if the sender has made the wrong action, it is not rational for her to
change her intended message to correspond to the actual action, in line with Aumann’s
(1990) argument. According to this interpretation, the multiple-selves model should not
be taken literally, but rather as a technical device to capture intra-personal sequential
processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the multiple-selves
approach to the game and the theoretical results, and generalizes the results beyond the
Stag-Hunt game. Section 3 reviews alternative ways to explain the timing effect and
their relation to the current analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 A multiple-selves approach to signaling actions
The multiple-selves approach has been widely used in economics, philosophy and psy-
chology, mostly to analyze situations in which the different selves have conﬂicting in-
terests (Moldoveanu and Stevenson, 2001), most prominently in issues of self control
(Strotz, 1955; Schelling, 1984), and particularly with regard to time preferences (Thaler
and Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006). The view of an agent as multiple
selves with identical preferences making decisions over time was previously used to
analyze problems associated with imperfect recall (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997; Au-
mann et al., 1997; Gilboa, 1997; Halpern, 1997). To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst application to modeling the timing of decisions made by a single player
with consistent information and preferences.
7For some games, a communicative equilibrium exists under both protocols, as Aumann (1990) il-
lustrates using the Battle-of-the-Sexes game. On the other hand, if the players have strictly-opposed



























Game 2: Stag-Hunt with signaling, action ﬁrst
To turn the normal form Game 1 into a signaling game with multiple selves, con-
struct an extensive form game with imperfect information, which has three players: the
sender’s acting self (denoted by SA), the sender’s signaling self (denoted by SS), and
the receiver (denoted by R). The receiver is always the last mover, and only observes
the choice of the sender’s signaling self, whereas the order of the ﬁrst two movers is
determined by the protocol. The resulting game trees for action-then-signal and signal-
then-action are shown as Games 2 and 3, respectively.
A sequential equilibrium in the game is a tuple {s1,s2,r,b}, where s1 ∈ [0,1]
is the mixed strategy of the ﬁrst mover, indicating a probability assigned to choosing
B; s2 : {A,B} → [0,1] is the strategy of the second mover, mapping the observed ﬁrst
mover’schoiceto a probabilityassigned to choosingB; r :{A,B}→[0,1]is the strategy
of the third mover’s decision, mapping the observed signal to a probability assigned to
choosing the action B. Finally, b : {A,B} → [0,1] is the third mover’s belief, mapping
the observed signal to the probability assigned to the action of SA being B. Note that s1
is an action and s2 is a message in Game 2 and vice versa in Game 3.
Let’s return to the original argument in favor of Nash equilibria as self-enforcing
agreements. In our signaling games, it is taken to mean that the sender sends a message
B, which reliably conveys the information that she plays B, i.e., if the action were A, the
message would also be A. Consequentially, the receiver believes this message and acts
accordingly.8 Formally, the followingconditions should be fulﬁlled in order to maintain
8The analysis is related to the model proposed by Cooper et al. (1992), who also look for reliable-
communication equilibria. However, their results rely on the analysis of the normal-form game, which
abstracts from temporal effects, and depend on further assumptions regarding the existence of altruistic



























Game 3: Stag-Hunt with signaling, message ﬁrst
such a reliable message to cooperate in a sequential equilibrium:
1. The ﬁrst mover chooses B; s1 = 1.
2. The second movermimics the choice of the ﬁrst mover; s2(A)=0 and s2(B)=1.
3. The third mover follows the signal; r(A) = 0 and r(B) = 1.
Proposition 1. A sequential equilibrium fulﬁlling conditions 1–3 exists in the message-
ﬁrst Game 3, but not in the action-ﬁrst Game 2.
Proof. First, check that conditions 1–3 can simultaneously hold in Game 3. Given that,
by conditions 2 and 3, both the acting sender and the receiver follow the signal, the ﬁrst
mover obtains a payoff of 90 by sending B versus 70 by sending A, hence condition 1
holds. Condition 3 states that the receiver follows the signal. Since the acting sender’s
best response to the receiver is to choose the same action, she maximizes her payoff
by following the signal as well, i.e., condition 2 holds. Lastly, given condition 2, the
receiver should follow a signal B with B; r(B) = 1. When the off-equilibrium signal A
is observed, the receiver’s consistent belief is that the acting sender played A, to which
he best-responds by playing A; r(A) = 0. Hence, condition 3 holds.
Next, consider the action-ﬁrst Game 2. Here, conditions 2 and 3 cannot hold si-
multaneously. To see this, assume that condition 3 holds, i.e., the receiver follows the
signal. Now, if the signaling sender observes an action A, she expects a payoff of 70
from sending an A signal versus a payoff of 80 from sending a B signal. Therefore, pay-
off maximization dictates that s2(A) = 1, thus contradicting condition 2, in line with
Aumann’s (1990) argument.
6Proposition 1 establishes that Game 3 has a communicative sequential equilibrium.
Thus, allowing for a pre-play message from one player extends the set of available
equilibria beyond babbling equilibria. In contrast, such a fully-communicative equi-
librium does not exist in Game 2. Can a more general negative statement be made
about Game 2? Are there only babbling equilibria in this game, or can some infor-
mation transmission be supported in equilibrium? It is, in fact, possible for the re-
ceiver to condition his beliefs on the message, for example in the equilibrium in which
s1 = 1;s2( ) = 1;r(A) = 0 and r(B) = 1;b(A) = 0.5 and b(B) = 1. However, there is
no informationtransmissioninvolved, since thesignal is not correlated withthe sender’s
action, and is therefore not reliable. The opposite, i.e., a reliable signal which is ig-
nored, is also possible in equilibrium. Consider, for example, the equilibrium in which
s1 = 0;s2(A) = 0.01;s2(B) = 1;r( ) = 0 and b( ) = 0. The message is much more
likely to be B when the sender’s action is B, but, since both messages are received in
equilibrium with a positive probability, the consistent belief of the receiver is r = 0
regardless of the message. Proposition 2 generalizes these observations:
Proposition 2. Game 2 has no communicative sequential equilibrium, in the sense that
the message conveys information (s2(A)  = s2(B)) and is acted upon (r(A)  = r(B)).
Proof. Assume that r(A)  = r(B) in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let r(A) <
r(B). The optimal message is now s2(A) = s2(B) = 1.
Proposition 1 can be easily extended to generic two-player games.9 Namely, pre-
play communication can be informative and conducive to coordination in the case of
multiple equilibria. More speciﬁcally, if a pareto-dominant equilibrium exists in the
original game, there exists a communicative equilibrium in the corresponding signaling
game leading to coordination on the efﬁcient equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3. Let G be a normal-form game with two players, a sender and a receiver,
who have strict preferences over all possible strategy proﬁles; and let G(G) be the sig-
nalinggame obtainedwhen the sender can send a messageto thereceiver, after which G
will be played. If G has two distinct equilibria, there exists a communicative sequential
equilibrium in G(G), in which the players coordinate on the actions corresponding to
the equilibrium in G that delivers the higher payoff to the sender.
Proof. Choose a message m. In the communicative sequential equilibrium of G(G), the
sender sends m, followingwhich the players coordinate on the desired equilibrium of G.
If any other message is sent, the players coordinate on the alternative equilibrium of G.
9In this setup, there is a straightforward generalization of the way in which communication is incor-
porated into the game, as the receiver has a unique best response to any signalled action (if the message
is believed). When the number of players increases, a more complex protocol of communicationmust be
applied, indicating the identity and timing of active communicators (Blume and Ortmann, 2007). I leave
this extension for future work.
7Given these strategies, all actions are optimal given correct beliefs as they constitute an
equilibrium in G. Furthermore, the sender lowers her payoff by deviating from sending
the message m.
Corollary 1. If G has a pareto-dominant equilibrium in, there exists a communicative
sequential equilibrium in G(G), in which this equilibrium is obtained.
Note that the proof can be trivially extended to any ﬁnite set of equilibria in G by
assigning a message to each equilibrium in E, and assigning the equilibrium in G in
which the sender receives her lowest equilibrium payoff to be played following any
other message.
3 The signiﬁcance of timing
The multiple-selves analysis reveals how the order of the decisions made by the sender
can affect the set of equilibria in the game. In this section I brieﬂy describe three other
theoretical approaches explaining the timing effects found by Charness (2000), and dis-
cuss their relation to the current analysis
3.1 Salience
In discussing the timing effect, Charness (2000) wrote: “Perhaps the reversal of the
order of signal and action brings the cognitive task and self-interest issue into sharper
focus, reducing the credibility of a signal” (p. 190). Aumann (1990) argues that a
sender would like to send a B signal, regardless of what she had already played or
intends to play. However, it is only when the sender ﬁnds herself in the position of
choosing a signal after having played A that this argument becomes most evident. Thus,
in the AS treatment, subjects are more likely to realize that a B signal should always be
chosen, both as senders and when they next come up as receivers (since the roles were
randomly reassigned before each period). Conversely, in the SA treatment, subjects are
not forced to face this realization, and can therefore keep the na¨ ıve notion that messages
are truthful.10
The multiple-selves interpretation of the game suggests that there is more to it than
simply the salience of the realization. Speciﬁcally, the concreteness of the act and the
mutability of the intention not only affect the salience of the unreliable strategy, but
in fact affect the best-response strategies, and hence the equilibrium structure. This
result can be taken as the underlying reason for the claim that “...the transparency of the
cognitive task appears to critically affect the credibility of the signal” (Charness, 2000,
p. 193).
10Indeed, this notion is so compelling that Aumann was required to write a short paper to confront it
and it is explicitly assumed by Farrell (1988), see section 3.2.
83.2 Sensible outcomes
The initial suggestion that the timing of the message might matter came from Farrell
(1988), who analyzed pre-play cheap-talk communication by taking into account the
natural-language content of messages. Underlying the analysis is the assumption that
“the players share a common language and that they will believe a speaker if there is no
reason for him to deceive them” (p. 209. See also Farrell, 1993). A message is taken
to be a suggestion for every player to play a subset of the (mixed) strategies available to
her. Farrell (1988) deﬁned a new solution concept he termed sensible outcomes, which
is based on the notion of consistent suggestions. The new solution concept is deﬁned in
such a way that it implies the play of (B,B) in the message-ﬁrst Stag-Hunt game.
A suggestion is consistent if every move suggested to each player is a best response
to some strategy proﬁle of the other players included in the suggestion. Hence, any
suggestion to play a pure Nash equilibrium is, by deﬁnition, consistent, and as such it
can support a sensible outcome. Furthermore, in deﬁning sensible outcomes, Farrell
(1988) assumed that the sender “will choose the suggestion... that he believes will be
best for him” (p. 211). It follows that (B,B) is the unique sensible outcome in Game 3
(cf. Farrell, 1988, Proposition 1).
Since the solution concept of sensible outcomes is deﬁned for pre-play communica-
tion, it cannot be extended to the case where the message follows the action. Accord-
ingly, Farrell (1988) concluded that, if the latter case is considered, “Aumann’s criticism
is compelling; if the former, than matters are rather unclear” (p. 213).
The current analysis differs from that of Farrell (1988) in several respects. First, the
effect of timing on the normative prescriptions in the game is derived using standard
game-theoretical tools, rather than being based on assumptions that are reasonable, but
may seem ad-hoc. Second, it is easily generalizable to any protocol of communication,
whereas the notion of sensible outcomes is speciﬁcally deﬁned for one-sided pre-play
communication, and as such does not apply to the timing effect in any formal or explicit
way. On the other hand, modeling the sender as comprised of distinct agents, while
allowing for new equilibria in the message-ﬁrst game, makes it impossible to eliminate
the risk-dominant equilibrium, as it removes the justiﬁcation for allowing the sender to
‘choose’ the equilibrium, as is assumed by Farrell (1988).
3.3 Cost of lies and promises
Another possible interpretation of the timing effect is to assume that players bear some
intrinsic cost of misrepresenting their action. The timing is crucial from this point of
view, as it alters the nature of the misrepresentation. If a false message follows the
action, it is a lie.11 If it precedes the action, then the action is promise-breaking.
11As the exact text in Charness (2000) was ‘I indicate that my play is B’, this deceptive message may
not be perceived as an explicit lie by some.
9The experimental evidence supports both the hypothesis that lying carries a cost
(Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009) and that breaking a promise carries a cost
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008), possibly mediated by beliefs about
expectations induced by the promise (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006, 2011). An additional assumption is required in order to explain
the timing effect observed by Charness (2000) through intrinsic preferences, namely
that the cost of breaking promises outweighs the cost of lying. Thus, the timing of the
message determines whether it is a promise – which is likely to be kept, or a report –
which is likely to be manipulated.
The results of the analysis presented here show that a promise, unlike truth-telling,
can be reliable in equilibrium. This can be taken to be the driving force behind the
hypothesized behavioral difference between the cost of lying and the cost of promise
breaking. However, this notion is difﬁcult to generalize to other games. To see this,




Game 4: Mixed Stag-Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma
The unique Nash equilibrium of Game 4 is (A,A). Nonetheless, if the row player
can make a promise to play B, and breaking the promise carries an intrinsic cost, the
outcome would be (B,B).12 However, modeling the sender as multiple agents, does not
giverise to a communicativeequilibriumas in the Stag-Hunt game. In this sense, cheap-
talk pre-play messages can be used to select between equilibria in coordination games,
but not to support strategies that are not rationalizable.13
4 Conclusion
In this paper I utilize a multiple-selves approach to capture intra-personal sequence of
decisions, and use this approach to test Farrell’s (1988) comment on Aumann’s (1990)
12This is indeed the outcome of the unique subgame-perfectequilibrium if the action of the row player
is observed by the column player.
13Similarly, Rapoport (1997) argues that the timing of the decisions of the players (without commu-
nication) selects the equilibrium that is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game if early moves are
observedwhen multiple Nash equilibriaexist in the normal-formgame, but does not extendthis argument
to allow for inclusion of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the sequential game that is not an equilibrium
of the normal-form game.
10conjecture that pre-play agreements do not generally facilitate coordination on a pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium. Farrell (1988) suggested that this claim only holds when the
messages signal a past action, a suggestion which was corroborated by the experimental
results obtained by Charness (2000). Using the new framework, I show that it is indeed
not irrational for the sender to follow up on a pre-play message and for the receiver to
believe this message. Furthermore, this result can be generalized to any coordination
game.14
When the message is sent following the action, the situation is different. Here Au-
mann’s (1990) argument ensures that only babbling equilibria exist, hence it is true that
“...it is as if [an agreement] had not been made” (p. 205). This difference between the
different protocols, which is captured by the multiple-selves model, provides an expla-
nation for the hitherto puzzling results of Charness (2000), and illuminates the intuitive
explanations for the timing effect. The analysis brings into focus the reason why com-
munication is more effective in facilitating cooperation if it precedes the action — it
could make the sender want to deviate from her planned action, when it is the time to
act. The difference between the two temporal orders as it emerges from the analysis
can be illustrated by considering the possibility of a player making a mistake. In the
SA condition, a sender who has sent the wrong signal by mistake would alter her action
accordingly, thus creating a contingency between the signal and the action.
This notion is related to the alternative explanations described in Section 3, but is
not equivalent to them, and does not depend on additional assumptions. This is not
to say that I believe that the other explanations are not valid. Indeed, several effects
may be at play in this game. The multiple-selves approach alone is able to provide an
explanation of the timing effect, but not the partial efﬁcacy of communication in the
AS treatment. Similarly, this approach does not provide a clear-cut explanation for the
ﬁndingsofClark etal. (2001), whofoundanincreased effect ofpre-play communication
when a sender who plays A does not strictly prefer the receiver to choose B.15 It does,
however, predict that the timing effect would disappear in this altered game. Possibly
some people are not sensitiveto the temporal order of the decisions, hence the increased
cooperation predicted forthe action-ﬁrst gamespillsovertothe signal-ﬁrstgamestudies
14Indeed, the set of equilibrium outcomes is the same with and without pre-play communication, as
there are still babbling equilibria in which the actions (A,A) are played. However, given the ubiquity of
babblingequilibria, the analysis of strategic communicationtypically focuses onthe most communicative
equilibria (Crawford,1998). Furthermore, the existence of a communicativeequilibrium may serve to al-
leviate the problem of coordinationin the followingmanner: when Alice and Bob play the original game,
Alice asks herself whether Bob is a prudent type, who plays in line with the risk-dominant equilibrium.
In the game with pre-play communication, Alice should also consider whether Bob is a communicative
type, who plays in line with the communicative equilibrium. Only if both answers are ‘yes’, will she
play A. As such, the existence of a communicative equilibrium suggests that it will be somewhat favored
by the players (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
15The actual game used was slightly different. An analogous game can be created from the games
depicted above by substituting a payoff of 75 for payoffs of 70 and 80 throughout.
11by Clark et al. (2001). Further experimental work is required to test the speciﬁc theories
and further elucidate the potential effects of communication in different settings.16
Understanding the effect of the timing of signals is important for the application
of the theory of cheap-talk messages. An understanding of the principles behind the
effect is important in order to predict how experimental ﬁndings can be generalized to
richer environments and different payoff structures. Previous literature has provided
some insights as to the signiﬁcance of the timing of the messages, but has failed in
providingaclearand generaltheory ableto generateunambiguouspredictionsregarding
the timing effect in different games. In this paper I aim to provide a formal, parameter-
free model, which is able to organize existing empirical knowledge as well as generate
new predictions for new situations. The discussion and the theoretical results provided
in the paper point toward future experimental research necessary to provide a better
understanding of current empirical ﬁndings.
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